/Users/andrea/_magisterarbeit/korpus/clean/testkorpus/23/file5.html NN ----------------------------------------- : subscribe VV back JJ issues NNS search NN maps NNS November NP 2005 CD Contents NNS The DT spider NN in IN the DT web NN Iran NP needs VVZ nuclear JJ energy NN , , not RB weapons NNS The DT bomb NN proliferates VVZ Which WDT countries NNS will MD go VV nuclear JJ next JJ . SENT Further RBR nuclear JJ information NN US NP . SENT the DT court NN of IN first JJ resort NN Snapshots NNS from IN Russia NP now RB Bolivia NP . SENT an DT Amayra NP for IN president NN Mauritania NP after IN the DT coup NN Mauritania NP . SENT a DT chronology NN Mauritania NP statistics NNS Sierra NP Leone NP s PP court NN of IN reconciliation NN Own JJ or CC share NN . SENT Open JJ sources NNS Cultural JJ diversity NN belongs VVZ to TO us PP all DT China NP buys VVZ into IN Japan NP Goytisolo NP speaks VVZ Goytisolo NP s PP changed VVD perspective NN A DT permanent JJ rebel NN The DT dark JJ grey JJ cloud NN of IN Europe NP Our PP$ fissile JJ world NN The DT bomb NN proliferates VVZ The DT original JJ intention NN in IN preventing VVG the DT proliferation NN of IN nuclear JJ weapons NNS was VBD less RBR the DT preservation NN of IN the DT world NN from IN nuclear JJ destruction NN than IN the DT retention NN of IN military JJ supremacy NN for IN those DT states NNS that WDT had VHD it PP already RB , , plus CC a DT few JJ chosen JJ allies NNS . SENT What WP will MD happen VV now RB . SENT By IN Georges NP Le NP Guelte NP THE DT more JJR countries NNS that WDT have VHP nuclear JJ weapons NNS , , the DT greater JJR the DT risk NN that IN they PP will MD be VB deliberately RB used VVN to TO destroy VV rather RB than IN deter VV , , that IN a DT conflict NN will MD be VB triggered VVN by IN mistake NN , , that IN a DT country NN will MD make VV a DT pre NP emptive JJ strike NN on IN an DT adversary NN s PP nuclear JJ installations NNS , , or CC that IN nuclear JJ weapons NNS or CC fissile JJ material NN will MD fall VV into IN the DT hands NNS of IN criminal JJ groups NNS . SENT Nuclear JJ proliferation NN is VBZ one CD of IN the DT greatest JJS dangers NNS for IN the DT future NN of IN humanity NN . SENT But CC that DT was VBD not RB why WRB steps NNS were VBD first RB taken VVN to TO prevent VV it PP . SENT From IN the DT beginning NN of IN its PP$ military JJ programme NN in IN 1942 CD , , the DT United NP States NPS banned VVD disclosure NN of IN any DT information NN about IN atomic JJ energy NN , , its PP$ aim NN being NN to TO prevent VV Nazi NP Germany NP becoming VVG the DT first JJ country NN to TO possess VV the DT bomb NN . SENT After IN 1945 CD the DT ban NN was VBD maintained VVN to TO delay VV work NN in IN the DT Soviet NP Union NP . SENT After IN the DT Soviet NP Union NP had VHD tested VVN its PP$ first JJ thermonuclear JJ device NN in IN 1954 CD , , secrecy NN was VBD abandoned VVN in IN favour NN of IN a DT policy NN of IN atoms NNS for IN peace NN , , under IN which WDT countries NNS wanting VVG to TO engage VV in IN nuclear JJ activities NNS could MD obtain VV assistance NN from IN the DT US NP provided VVD they PP undertook VVD to TO use VV the DT technology NN only RB for IN peaceful JJ purposes NNS . SENT They PP remained VVD free JJ to TO develop VV a DT military JJ programme NN if IN they PP were VBD able JJ to TO do VV so RB on IN their PP$ own JJ , , and CC several JJ countries NNS took VVD advantage NN of IN the DT absence NN of IN overall JJ international JJ regulation NN to TO pursue VV their PP$ military JJ ambitions NNS . SENT Seven CD of IN the DT eight CD countries NNS that WDT now RB have VHP a DT nuclear JJ arsenal NN acquired VVD the DT know VV how WRB in IN 1960 CD 1 CD . SENT The DT Cuban JJ missile NN crisis NN in IN 1962 CD was VBD the DT main JJ factor NN in IN the DT establishment NN of IN a DT global JJ non JJ proliferation NN policy NN . SENT Washington NP and CC Moscow NP realised VVD that IN if IN another DT country NN with IN nuclear JJ weapons NNS had VHD been VBN involved VVN , , they PP might MD not RB have VH managed VVN to TO control VV the DT crisis NN . SENT The DT two CD superpowers NNS originally RB saw VVD the DT Non JJ Proliferation NN Treaty NP NPT NP mainly RB as IN a DT means VVZ to TO keep VV control NN of IN the DT countries NNS in IN their PP$ blocs NNS . SENT It PP was VBD signed VVN on IN 1 CD July NP 1968 CD and CC divided VVN the DT world NN in IN two CD . SENT nuclear JJ weapon NN states NNS , , those DT that WDT had VHD exploded VVN a DT nuclear JJ device NN before IN 1 CD January NP 1967 CD and CC were VBD required VVN not RB to TO help VV other JJ countries NNS acquire VV such JJ weapons NNS 2 CD . SENT and CC all PDT the DT rest NN , , which WDT were VBD required VVN not RB to TO attempt VV to TO acquire VV nuclear JJ weapons NNS and CC to TO place VV all PDT their PP$ nuclear JJ facilities NNS under IN the DT control NN of IN the DT International NP Atomic JJ Energy NP Agency NP IAEA NP . SENT For IN all PDT its PP$ shortcomings NNS , , the DT NPT NP provides VVZ the DT means VVZ to TO prevent VV the DT spread NN of IN nuclear JJ weapons NNS . SENT Had VHD it PP been VBN applied VVN in IN full JJ , , only RB five CD countries NNS would MD still RB have VH a DT nuclear JJ arsenal NN . SENT But CC for IN it PP to TO succeed VV , , it PP had VHD to TO be VB universal JJ . SENT all DT states NNS had VHD to TO accede VV to TO it PP , , the DT control NN machinery NN had VHD to TO be VB totally RB efficient JJ and CC , , in IN the DT event NN of IN violation NN , , strong JJ measures NNS had VHD to TO be VB taken VVN to TO end VV the DT violation NN and CC deter VV other JJ states NNS from IN following VVG suit NN . SENT The DT first JJ signatories NNS From IN the DT outset NN , , many JJ states NNS saw VVD the DT NPT NN as IN an DT unacceptable JJ infringement NN of IN their PP$ sovereignty NN . SENT Germany NP , , Japan NP and CC Italy NP , , at IN which WDT it PP was VBD originally RB aimed VVN , , at IN first RB refused VVN to TO sign VV it PP . SENT It PP entered VVD into IN force NN in IN 1970 CD 3 CD because IN it PP had VHD been VBN signed VVN by IN countries NNS such JJ as IN Ireland NP , , Denmark NP , , Canada NP , , Sweden NP and CC Mexico NP , , which WDT saw VVD it PP as IN a DT means NN of IN reducing VVG the DT risk NN of IN collective JJ suicide NN , , by IN states NNS closely RB aligned VVN with IN the DT US NP or CC the DT Soviet NP Union NP , , and CC by IN countries NNS that WDT did VVD not RB think VV they PP would MD ever RB have VH the DT means VVZ to TO manufacture VV atomic JJ weapons NNS . SENT Iraq NP , , Iran NP and CC Syria NP were VBD among IN the DT first JJ signatories NNS . SENT A DT turning VVG point NN came VVD in IN the DT mid JJ 1970 CD s PP with IN the DT rise NN of IN the DT anti JJ nuclear JJ movement NN in IN the DT US NP and CC then RB in IN Europe NP , , and CC above IN all DT with IN India NP s PP first JJ nuclear JJ test NN in IN 1974 CD . SENT Public JJ opinion NN was VBD alarmed VVN at IN the DT dangers NNS of IN proliferation NN for IN world NN security NN , , and CC many JJ states NNS decided VVD they PP would MD be VB more RBR secure JJ if IN their PP$ neighbours NNS had VHD no DT nuclear JJ weapons NNS . SENT Combined VVN with IN pressure NN from IN both CC the DT US NP and CC the DT Soviet NP Union NP , , the DT anti JJ nuclear JJ movement NN brought VVN about IN a DT rapid JJ increase NN in IN the DT number NN of IN NPT JJ signatories NNS , , now RB joined VVN by IN major JJ industrialised VVN countries NNS such JJ as IN Germany NP , , Japan NP , , Italy NP , , Switzerland NP and CC the DT Netherlands NPS . SENT By IN 1979 CD more JJR than IN 100 CD states NNS had VHD signed VVN . SENT The DT wave NN of IN accessions NNS continued VVN and CC accelerated VVN after IN the DT end NN of IN the DT cold JJ war NN , , despite IN the DT break NN up RB of IN the DT Soviet NP Union NP . SENT In IN 1995 CD , , when WRB the DT signatory NN countries NNS decided VVD to TO prolong VV the DT NPT NN indefinitely RB , , they PP numbered VVD 178 CD . SENT Yet RB for IN various JJ reasons NNS the DT major JJ powers NNS have VHP never RB made VVN the DT necessary JJ effort NN to TO persuade VV India NP , , Israel NP and CC Pakistan NP to TO join VV them PP . SENT These DT have VHP always RB refused VVN to TO accede VV to TO the DT NPT NN and CC have VHP been VBN able JJ to TO acquire VV nuclear JJ weapons NNS without IN infringing VVG their PP$ international JJ obligations NNS . SENT That DT would MD no RB longer RBR be VB possible JJ today NN . SENT the DT treaty NN has VHZ 189 CD signatories NNS 4 CD , , almost RB all DT existing JJ states NNS , , and CC no DT country NN would MD be VB able JJ to TO build VV a DT nuclear JJ explosive JJ device NN without IN violating VVG its PP$ international JJ commitments NNS . SENT Among IN those DT states NNS are VBP Argentina NP and CC Brazil NP , , countries NNS that WDT embarked VVD on IN nuclear JJ programmes NNS with IN military JJ aims NNS in IN the DT 1970 CD s PP and CC 1980 CD s PP . SENT Since IN they PP had VHD not RB signed VVN the DT NPT NN at IN the DT time NN , , those DT activities NNS did VVD not RB conflict NN with IN their PP$ international JJ obligations NNS . SENT Both DT abandoned VVD their PP$ military JJ programmes NNS and CC acceded VVD to TO the DT NPT NP , , Argentina NP in IN 1995 CD and CC Brazil NP in IN 1998 CD . SENT They PP did VVD so RB not RB because IN their PP$ external JJ security NN had VHD improved VVN , , but CC because IN military JJ dictatorships NNS in IN power NN had VHD been VBN replaced VVN by IN democratic JJ regimes NNS . SENT The DT same JJ applies VVZ to TO South NP Africa NP , , which WDT built VVD half PDT a DT dozen NN nuclear JJ bombs NNS in IN the DT 1970 CD s PP and CC 1980 CD s PP without IN violating VVG any DT international JJ obligations NNS and CC with IN the DT IAEA NN unable JJ to TO intervene VV . SENT It PP dismantled VVD its PP$ weapons NNS shortly RB before IN abandoning VVG apartheid NN and CC acceded VVD to TO the DT NPT NN in IN 1991 CD . SENT In IN the DT mid JJ 1990 CD s PP the DT US NP sought VVD to TO bolster VV the DT NPT NN with IN a DT Comprehensive NP Test NP Ban NP Treaty NP CTBT NP and CC a DT convention NN banning VVG the DT production NN of IN enriched VVN uranium NN or CC weapons NNS grade NN plutonium NN . SENT Both DT agreements NNS were VBD aimed VVN solely RB at IN India NP and CC Pakistan NP , , but CC the DT US NP believed VVD it PP would MD be VB easier JJR for IN them PP to TO sign VV a DT treaty NN that WDT applied VVD to TO all DT countries NNS . SENT Of IN doubtful JJ use NN In IN fact NN , , the DT agreements NNS are VBP almost RB meaningless JJ for IN other JJ countries NNS . SENT Since IN 184 CD states NNS have VHP already RB undertaken VVN not RB to TO acquire VV nuclear JJ weapons NNS , , it PP would MD be VB no DT great JJ achievement NN for IN them PP to TO promise VV not RB to TO test VV weapons NNS they PP do VVP not RB intend VV to TO build VV . SENT The DT five CD nuclear JJ weapon NN states NNS have VHP stopped VVN their PP$ tests NNS France NP would MD not RB be VB able JJ to TO resume VV them PP since IN it PP has VHZ dismantled VVN its PP$ Pacific NP test NN polygon NN . SENT But CC India NP and CC Pakistan NP exploded VVD nuclear JJ devices NNS in IN 1998 CD , , continue VVP to TO produce VV fissile JJ material NN , , and CC refuse VVP to TO accede VV to TO the DT CTBT NN or CC convention NN . SENT Inability NN to TO conduct NN tests NNS has VHZ not RB prevented VVN countries NNS from IN acquiring VVG weapons NNS . SENT Israel NP has VHZ never RB tested VVN a DT nuclear JJ device NN , , but CC all DT specialists NNS agree VVP that IN it PP has VHZ a DT nuclear JJ arsenal NN . SENT South NP Africa NP never RB officially RB had VHD any DT nuclear JJ tests NNS , , yet CC it PP possessed VVD several JJ weapons NNS . SENT Nor CC is VBZ there RB any DT doubt NN that IN there EX were VBD weapons NNS in IN Pakistan NP even RB before IN 1998 CD . SENT The DT draft NN treaty NN , , which WDT the DT US NP now RB refuses VVZ to TO sign VV , , is VBZ nearly RB worthless JJ apart RB from IN the DT symbolic JJ value NN attributed VVD to TO it PP by IN public JJ opinion NN . SENT The DT IAEA NN is VBZ responsible JJ for IN verifying VVG that DT states NNS comply VV with IN treaty NN obligations NNS , , but CC its PP$ task NN was VBD always RB complicated VVN . SENT IAEA NN inspectors NNS can MD only RB enter VV an DT NPT JJ signatory NN country NN that WDT has VHZ concluded VVN and CC ratified VVN a DT special JJ agreement NN with IN the DT IAEA NN setting VVG out RP its PP$ rights NNS and CC obligations NNS . SENT They PP were VBD unable JJ to TO enter VV North NP Korea NP until IN April NP 1992 CD , , although IN the DT existence NN of IN the DT reactor NN and CC reprocessing VVG plant NN that IN produced VVN plutonium NN had VHD been VBN known VVN since IN 1990 CD . SENT Inspectors NNS access NN to TO installations NNS is VBZ hampered VVN by IN administrative JJ restrictions NNS . SENT They PP must MD first RB apply VV for IN visas NNS , , which WDT may MD take VV time NN , , and CC are VBP allowed VVN to TO inspect VV a DT given VVN installation NN only RB for IN a DT time NN calculated VVN strictly RB according VVG to TO the DT nature NN of IN its PP$ activities NNS and CC the DT quantity NN of IN uranium NN and CC plutonium NN it PP contains VVZ . SENT The DT 1970 CD s PP control VVP system NN The DT rules NNS governing VVG the DT activities NNS of IN IAEA NN inspectors NNS were VBD laid VVN down RP in IN 1971 CD , , not RB by IN IAEA NN officials NNS , , who WP could MD have VH specified VVN the DT means NNS required VVN to TO carry VV out RP their PP$ task NN , , but CC by IN representatives NNS of IN the DT signatory NN states NNS , , especially RB those DT most RBS advanced JJ in IN the DT field NN at IN the DT time NN . SENT They PP took VVD care NN to TO keep VV to TO a DT minimum NN the DT constraints NNS that IN inspections NNS would MD place VV upon IN them PP and CC their PP$ industrial JJ enterprises NNS . SENT The DT inspection NN machinery NN was VBD based VVN on IN the DT assumption NN that IN a DT nuclear JJ programme NN could MD not RB be VB pursued VVN secretly RB and CC that IN the DT only JJ way NN of IN cheating NN was VBD to TO divert VV for IN military JJ purposes NNS uranium NN or CC plutonium NN that WDT should MD have VH remained VVN in IN the DT civil JJ domain NN . SENT So IN the DT inspectors NNS only RB had VHD access NN to TO installations NNS whose WP$ existence NN was VBD declared VVN by IN the DT signatory NN states NNS , , and CC their PP$ task NN was VBD to TO ensure VV that IN all DT fissile JJ material NN entering VVG those DT installations NNS was VBD used VVN for IN peaceful JJ purposes NNS . SENT They PP did VVD not RB have VH to TO check VV whether IN a DT country NN had VHD nuclear JJ facilities NNS whose WP$ existence NN had VHD not RB been VBN declared VVN . SENT These DT restrictions NNS were VBD not RB wholly RB unreasonable JJ considering VVG the DT technology NN of IN the DT period NN . SENT The DT production NN of IN enriched VVN uranium NN then RB required VVN large JJ plants NNS with IN a DT characteristic JJ layout NN and CC high JJ power NN consumption NN , , whose WP$ construction NN and CC operation NN could MD not RB go VV undetected JJ . SENT In IN the DT early JJ 1970 CD s PP only RB highly RB industrialised VVN countries NNS could MD contemplate VV large JJ scale NN nuclear JJ activities NNS . SENT Such JJ countries NNS were VBD democratic JJ states NNS in IN which WDT information NN circulated VVD freely RB and CC a DT decision NN to TO acquire VV nuclear JJ weapons NNS could MD scarcely RB be VB kept VVN secret JJ . SENT Within IN the DT limits NNS , , the DT control NN system NN worked VVD reasonably RB well RB , , no DT explosive JJ device NN having VHG been VBN manufactured VVN since IN 1945 CD in IN a DT facility NN under IN the DT surveillance NN of IN the DT IAEA NN . SENT The DT controls NNS are VBP not RB are VBP infallible JJ , , but CC up RB to TO now RB they PP have VHP been VBN effective JJ enough RB for IN those DT tempted VVN to TO cheat VV to TO prefer VV not RB to TO run VV the DT risk NN of IN being VBG caught VVN by IN IAEA NN inspectors NNS . SENT Nevertheless RB , , after IN the DT Gulf NP war NN of IN 1990 CD 91 CD , , installations NNS were VBD discovered VVN in IN Iraq NP that WDT would MD have VH enabled VVN it PP to TO acquire VV a DT nuclear JJ arsenal NN within IN a DT few JJ years NNS . SENT Saddam NP Hussein NP proved VVD that DT clandestine JJ nuclear JJ activities NNS are VBP possible JJ , , at IN least JJS in IN a DT country NN subject NN to TO ruthless JJ dictatorship NN . SENT The DT Iraqis NNS had VHD used VVN the DT centrifugal JJ enrichment NN process NN introduced VVN in IN Europe NP in IN the DT mid JJ 1970 CD s PP , , which WDT requires VVZ much RB smaller JJR facilities NNS that WDT can MD be VB housed VVN in IN unobtrusive JJ buildings NNS , , consume VVP much RB less JJR energy NN , , and CC are VBP unlikely JJ to TO be VB detected VVN by IN intelligence NN services NNS unless IN they PP have VHP informers NNS on IN the DT spot NN . SENT Exemptions NNS for IN the DT five CD In IN 1997 CD , , to TO adapt VV its PP$ control NN machinery NN to TO this DT new JJ cheating NN , , the DT IAEA NN adopted VVD an DT additional JJ protocol NN 5 CD that WDT gives VVZ its PP$ inspectors NNS enhanced JJ powers NNS , , although IN they PP can MD only RB be VB applied VVN to TO states NNS that WDT have VHP signed VVN and CC ratified VVD it PP 6 CD . SENT These DT powers NNS have VHP produced VVN significant JJ results NNS 7 CD and CC could MD give VV IAEA NN inspectors NNS the DT means NN to TO detect VV the DT existence NN of IN activities NNS conducted VVN in IN secret NN . SENT But CC they PP are VBP not RB a DT panacea NN . SENT Unless IN the DT inspectors NNS are VBP lucky JJ , , they PP are VBP unlikely JJ to TO identify VV a DT clandestine JJ installation NN without IN having VHG been VBN informed VVN of IN its PP$ location NN by IN an DT intelligence NN service NN . SENT An DT international JJ organisation NN such JJ as IN the DT IAEA NN is VBZ not RB an DT espionage NN agency NN . SENT It PP has VHZ no DT means NN of IN acquiring VVG secret JJ information NN and CC must MD respect VV the DT agreements NNS concluded VVD with IN countries NNS whose WP$ activities NNS it PP investigates VVZ . SENT Locating VVG the DT exact JJ site NN of IN a DT nuclear JJ plant NN is VBZ a DT job NN for IN intelligence NN services NNS . SENT it PP is VBZ up RB to TO them PP to TO provide VV the DT IAEA NN with IN the DT information NN . SENT None NN of IN the DT five CD nuclear JJ weapon NN states NNS is VBZ required VVN to TO sign VV the DT additional JJ protocol NN . SENT It PP would MD be VB no DT surprise NN if IN the DT inspectors NNS concluded VVD that IN there EX are VBP military JJ nuclear JJ installations NNS on IN well RB known VVN sites NNS in IN the DT US NP or CC France NP . SENT Nevertheless RB France NP has VHZ symbolically RB signed VVN a DT sweetened VVN version NN of IN the DT protocol NN to TO humour VV its PP$ partners NNS in IN the DT European NP Union NP , , for IN whom WP the DT difference NN in IN treatment NN of IN the DT two CD categories NNS of IN states NNS is VBZ a DT sensitive JJ issue NN . SENT Nor CC is VBZ there RB a DT treaty NN banning VVG the DT five CD from IN manufacturing VVG new JJ types NNS of IN weapons NNS , , although IN that WDT would MD be VB contrary JJ to TO the DT spirit NN of IN Article NP VI NP of IN the DT NPT NN . SENT It PP is VBZ not RB entirely RB contrary JJ to TO the DT letter NN of IN the DT treaty NN , , which WDT hypocritically RB establishes VVZ a DT link NN between IN nuclear JJ disarmament NN and CC general JJ , , complete JJ disarmament NN . SENT For IN more JJR than IN 40 CD years NNS the DT five CD nuclear JJ weapon NN states NNS , , which WDT are VBP also RB the DT world NN s PP leading VVG exporters NNS of IN conventional JJ weapons NNS , , have VHP deliberately RB refrained VVN from IN calling VVG for IN general JJ disarmament NN while IN cynically RB invoking VVG lack NN of IN progress NN in IN that DT area NN to TO ignore VV their PP$ own JJ commitment NN to TO nuclear JJ disarmament NN . SENT The DT US NP regularly RB talks VVZ about IN building VVG new JJ nuclear JJ weapons NNS . SENT The DT arms NNS manufacturers NNS , , who WP have VHP been VBN grasping VVG for IN decades NNS at IN every DT argument NN for IN developing VVG their PP$ activities NNS , , are VBP obsessed VVN with IN the DT idea NN . SENT These DT plans NNS have VHP no DT real JJ operational JJ significance NN , , but CC they PP monopolise VV public JJ attention NN and CC have VHP obscured VVD the DT more RBR important JJ changes NNS introduced VVN by IN the DT nuclear JJ posture NN review NN of IN January NP 2002 CD . SENT In IN particular JJ , , nuclear JJ weapons NNS are VBP no RB longer RB a DT separate JJ category NN of IN US NP weaponry NN . SENT they PP are VBP now RB an DT integral JJ part NN of IN its PP$ offensive JJ strike NN system NN and CC , , like IN any DT other JJ weapon NN , , can MD be VB used VVN by IN the DT president NN as IN he PP sees VVZ fit NN , , according VVG to TO the DT mission NN . SENT The DT review NN also RB proposed VVD the DT recruitment NN of IN a DT new JJ generation NN of IN arms NNS specialists NNS to TO carry VV on IN when WRB the DT present JJ generation NN retires VVZ , , and CC the DT replacement NN of IN US NP intercontinental JJ ballistic JJ missiles NNS in IN 2020 CD , , submarines NNS in IN 2030 CD and CC bombers NNS in IN 2040 CD . SENT The DT US NP nuclear JJ arsenal NN is VBZ conceived VVN for IN the DT indefinite JJ term NN . SENT at IN any DT rate NN until IN the DT end NN of IN the DT century NN . SENT If IN the DT IAEA NN finds VVZ that IN a DT state NN has VHZ infringed VVN its PP$ obligations NNS , , it PP refers VVZ the DT matter NN to TO the DT UN NP Security NP Council NP , , which WDT is VBZ the DT only JJ body NN authorised VVD to TO take VV measures NNS to TO end VV the DT infringement NN . SENT The DT UN NP has VHZ twice RB dealt VVN with IN violations NNS of IN non JJ proliferation NN commitments NNS , , with IN mixed JJ results NNS . SENT In IN Iraq NP , , whose WP$ clandestine JJ activities NNS were VBD not RB discovered VVN until IN after IN the DT Gulf NP war NN in IN 1991 CD , , when WRB it PP had VHD been VBN defeated VVN militarily RB and CC was VBD obliged VVN to TO accept VV the DT conditions NNS imposed VVN by IN the DT Security NP Council NP , , the DT IAEA NN was VBD able JJ to TO destroy VV all PDT the DT installations NNS that WDT had VHD been VBN built VVN illegally RB . SENT Non JJ proliferation NN . SENT a DT cold JJ war NN concept NN . SENT In IN 1992 CD the DT Democratic JJ People NNS s PP Republic NP of IN Korea NP North NP Korea NP was VBD condemned VVN for IN violating VVG its PP$ commitments NNS under IN the DT treaty NN . SENT It PP reacted VVD almost RB immediately RB by IN announcing VVG that IN it PP would MD consider VV any DT penalty NN as IN an DT act NN of IN war NN , , and CC China NP proclaimed VVD that IN the DT crisis NN should MD be VB settled VVN by IN negotiation NN . SENT Beijing NP s PP attitude NN , , plus CC fear VVP of IN a DT war NN liable JJ to TO cause VV many JJ casualties NNS in IN South NP Korea NP , , led VVN in IN 1994 CD to TO an DT agreement NN between IN Pyongyang NP and CC Washington NP under IN which WDT South NP Korea NP undertook VVD to TO build VV two CD large JJ electricity NN generating VVG reactors NNS in IN the DT North NP in IN exchange NN for IN an DT end NN to TO North JJ Korean JJ nuclear JJ activities NNS . SENT This DT agreement NN held VVN until IN the DT US NP decided VVD to TO terminate VV it PP at IN the DT end NN of IN 2002 CD , , whereupon IN North NP Korea NP withdrew VVD from IN the DT NPT NP , , expelled VVD the DT IAEA NN inspectors NNS and CC announced VVD a DT few JJ months NNS later RBR that IN it PP now RB possessed VVD nuclear JJ weapons NNS . SENT None NN of IN these DT decisions NNS drew VVD any DT reaction NN from IN the DT Security NP Council NP or CC other JJ countries NNS , , except IN for IN terrifying JJ but CC ineffectual JJ threats NNS from IN the DT president NN of IN the DT US NP . SENT Since IN then RB , , and CC in IN accordance NN with IN China NP s PP wishes VVZ , , there EX have VHP been VBN joint JJ negotiations NNS among IN North NP and CC South NP Korea NP , , the DT US NP , , China NP , , Japan NP and CC Russia NP 8 CD . SENT Under IN the DT terms NNS of IN a DT joint JJ declaration NN signed VVN on IN 19 CD September NP 2005 CD , , North NP Korea NP agreed VVD to TO abandon VV its PP$ nuclear JJ programmes NNS in IN exchange NN for IN energy NN aid NN and CC security NN guarantees NNS from IN the DT other JJ countries NNS . SENT But CC Pyongyang NP questioned VVD the DT agreement NN the DT next JJ day NN , , demanding VVG recognition NN of IN its PP$ right NN to TO use VV nuclear JJ energy NN for IN peaceful JJ purposes NNS , , before IN softening VVG its PP$ position NN again RB . SENT North NP Korea NP s PP announcement NN of IN its PP$ intention NN to TO renounce VV nuclear JJ weapons NNS has VHZ been VBN welcomed VVN by IN the DT IAEA NN in IN a DT resolution NN adopted VVD unanimously RB by IN 139 CD member NN states NNS on IN 30 CD September NP . SENT In IN Iran NP , , no DT infringement NN has VHZ been VBN established VVN if IN , , as IN the DT IAEA NN is VBZ entitled VVN to TO do VV , , it PP interprets VVZ the DT treaty NN literally RB . SENT But CC if IN the DT current JJ talks NNS with IN Britain NP , , France NP and CC Germany NP do VVP not RB produce VV a DT satisfactory JJ outcome NN , , IAEA NN member NN states NNS may MD refer VV the DT matter NN to TO the DT Security NP Council NP on IN the DT basis NN of IN a DT political JJ , , rather RB than IN a DT legal JJ , , interpretation NN of IN the DT text NN . SENT Non JJ proliferation NN policy NN has VHZ been VBN seriously RB undermined VVN since IN the DT 1995 CD conference NN , , when WRB the DT main JJ aim NN seemed VVD to TO have VH been VBN achieved VVN . SENT The DT need NN to TO halt VV the DT spread NN of IN nuclear JJ weapons NNS was VBD challenged VVN by IN neoconservatives NNS in IN the DT US NP , , who WP do VVP not RB want VV the DT country NN bound VVN by IN any DT international JJ obligations NNS . SENT They PP have VHP been VBN followed VVN by IN others NNS for IN whom WP non JJ proliferation NN is VBZ a DT cold JJ war NN concept NN that WDT makes VVZ no DT sense NN now RB the DT cold JJ war NN is VBZ over RP , , and CC who WP believe VVP the DT appropriate JJ response NN to TO the DT threat NN of IN nuclear JJ proliferation NN is VBZ the DT construction NN of IN anti JJ missile NN defence NN systems NNS , , which WDT all DT countries NNS should MD have VH to TO purchase VV from IN the DT US NP . SENT Others NNS , , perhaps RB more RBR numerous JJ or CC more RBR influential JJ , , consider VV that DT nuclear JJ proliferation NN should MD not RB be VB condemned VVN if IN the DT countries NNS involved VVN are VBP allies NNS of IN Washington NP . SENT The DT NPT NP has VHZ also RB been VBN severely RB criticised VVN . SENT For IN many JJ years NNS there RB have VHP been VBN complaints NNS about IN an DT arrangement NN that WDT allows VVZ five CD countries NNS to TO possess VV the DT most RBS powerful JJ weapons NNS and CC bans VVZ all DT others NNS from IN acquiring VVG them PP . SENT Such JJ unequal JJ treatment NN was VBD deemed VVN inevitable JJ during IN the DT cold JJ war NN , , but CC it PP has VHZ been VBN much RB harder JJR to TO put VV up RP with IN since IN the DT collapse NN of IN the DT Soviet NP Union NP . SENT What WP has VHZ aggravated VVN this DT frustration NN is VBZ that IN the DT NPT NN also RB contains VVZ provisions NNS on IN nuclear JJ disarmament NN , , which WDT the DT five CD states NNS have VHP ignored VVN . SENT By IN maintaining VVG their PP$ nuclear JJ arsenals NNS at IN mid JJ 1970 CD s PP levels NNS , , the DT five CD can MD only RB encourage VV others NNS to TO follow VV . SENT Disillusionment NN with IN the DT idea NN of IN non JJ proliferation NN was VBD strikingly RB evident JJ at IN the DT NPT JJ review NN conference NN , , 2 CD 27 CD May NP 2005 CD . SENT Instead RB of IN unanimously RB condemning VVG those DT signatories NNS that WDT cheated VVD on IN their PP$ obligations NNS , , the DT participating VVG states NNS parted VVD without IN reaching VVG any DT agreement NN , , revealing VVG a DT world NN divided VVN , , disillusioned VVN and CC distressed JJ . SENT Meanwhile RB the DT much RB decried VVD NPT JJ system NN , , to TO which WDT no DT alternative NN has VHZ ever RB been VBN proposed VVN , , remains VVZ in IN force NN , , and CC its PP$ fate NN may MD well RB be VB decided VVN by IN the DT outcome NN of IN the DT North JJ Korean JJ and CC Iranian JJ crises NNS . SENT If IN North NP Korea NP and CC Iran NP abandon VV their PP$ military JJ ambitions NNS , , as IN many JJ have VHP done VVN before IN them PP , , countries NNS that WDT might MD be VB tempted VVN to TO imitate VV them PP will MD probably RB think VV again RB about IN embarking VVG on IN a DT costly JJ project NN that WDT appears VVZ doomed VVN to TO failure NN . SENT If IN they PP get VVP their PP$ own JJ way NN , , several JJ other JJ states NNS may MD also RB decide VV to TO develop VV nuclear JJ weapons NNS . SENT See VV also RB Further RBR nuclear JJ information NN Which WDT countries NNS will MD go VV nuclear JJ next JJ . SENT , , by IN Georges NP Le NP Guelte NP Iran NP needs VVZ nuclear JJ energy NN , , not RB weapons NNS , , by IN Cyrus NP Safdari NP More RBR about IN Georges NP Le NP Guelte NP . SENT Translated VVN by IN Barry NP Smerin NP Georges NPS Le NP Guelte NP is VBZ director NN of IN research NN at IN the DT Institute NP of IN International NP and CC Strategic NP Relations NPS IRIS NN , , Paris NP 1 CD The DT Soviet NP Union NP tested VVD its PP$ first JJ A NP bomb NN in IN 1949 CD and CC its PP$ first JJ H NN bomb NN in IN 1953 CD . SENT Britain NP exploded VVD its PP$ first JJ fission NN device NN in IN 1952 CD and CC its PP$ first JJ fusion NN bomb NN in IN 1957 CD . SENT for IN France NP , , the DT dates NNS are VBP 1960 CD and CC 1968 CD . SENT for IN China NP , , 1964 CD and CC 1967 CD . SENT In IN 1956 CD France NP supplied VVD Israel NP with IN the DT Dimona NP reactor NN and CC reprocessing VVG plant NN that WDT produced VVD the DT plutonium NN for IN its PP$ first JJ weapons NNS , , and CC in IN 1955 CD Canada NP delivered VVN to TO India NP the DT heavy JJ water NN reactor NN that WDT produced VVD the DT plutonium NN for IN the DT first JJ Indian JJ bombs NNS . SENT 2 CD In IN order NN of IN first JJ explosion NN . SENT the DT US NP , , the DT Soviet NP Union NP of IN which WDT Russia NP is VBZ the DT successor NN state NN , , Britain NP , , France NP and CC China NP . SENT Contrary JJ to TO a DT widespread JJ misconception NN , , there EX is VBZ no DT formal JJ link NN between IN permanent JJ membership NN of IN the DT Security NP Council NP and CC the DT status NN of IN nuclear JJ weapon NN state NN . SENT The DT permanent JJ members NNS of IN the DT Security NP Council NP which WDT were VBD the DT victorious JJ powers NNS in IN the DT second JJ world NN war NN were VBD designated VVN as IN such JJ by IN the DT UN NP Charter NP signed VVD on IN 26 CD June NP 1945 CD , , when WRB no DT country NN possessed VVD a DT nuclear JJ device NN . SENT Nuclear JJ weapon NN countries NNS are VBP those DT which WDT had VHD them PP at IN the DT time NN the DT NPT NN was VBD signed VVN . SENT 3 LS The DT text NN of IN the DT treaty NN stipulates VVZ that IN it PP will MD enter VV into IN force NN when WRB it PP has VHZ been VBN signed VVN and CC ratified VVN by IN a DT total NN of IN 40 CD states NNS . SENT 4 LS This DT would MD be VB reduced VVN to TO 188 CD if IN account NN were VBD taken VVN of IN North NP Korea NP s PP decision NN of IN January NP 2003 CD to TO withdraw VV from IN the DT treaty NN . SENT However RB , , the DT other JJ countries NNS do VVP not RB recognise VV that DT decision NN , , since IN it PP does VVZ not RB comply VV with IN the DT conditions NNS laid VVN down RP for IN a DT state NN to TO exercise VV its PP$ right NN to TO withdrawal NN . SENT 5 LS The DT full JJ title NN is VBZ Protocol NP additional JJ to TO the DT agreement NN between IN . SENT . SENT . SENT name NN of IN state NN and CC the DT International NP Atomic JJ Energy NP Agency NP on IN the DT application NN of IN safeguards NNS . SENT 6 CD Iran NP has VHZ signed VVN the DT additional JJ protocol NN but CC not RB ratified VVD it PP , , and CC the DT new JJ parliament NN is VBZ unlikely JJ to TO approve VV the DT document NN . SENT The DT Iranian JJ authorities NNS sometimes RB claim VVP to TO be VB complying VVG with IN it PP on IN a DT voluntary JJ basis NN , , but CC they PP do VVP so RB only RB partially RB and CC with IN considerable JJ reservations NNS . SENT 7 CD In IN 2004 CD IAEA NN inspectors NNS established VVN that IN South NP Korea NP and CC Taiwan NP had VHD in IN the DT past NN secretly RB conducted VVN research NN into IN uranium NN enrichment NN and CC plutonium NN separation NN techniques NNS . SENT This DT work NN remained VVD secret JJ until IN they PP acceded VVD to TO the DT additional JJ protocol NN . SENT 8 CD In IN this DT framework NN Washington NP agreed VVD to TO bilateral JJ talks NNS with IN Pyongyang NP , , which WDT it PP had VHD hitherto RB rejected VVN . SENT English JJ language NN editorial NN director NN . SENT Wendy NP Kristianasen NP all DT rights NNS reserved VVD 1997 CD 2005 CD Le NP Monde NP diplomatique NN . SENT